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Abstract Recent findings in experimental philosophy
have revealed that people attribute intentionality, belief,
desire, knowledge, and blame asymmetrically to side-
effects depending on whether the agent who produces the
side-effect violates or adheres to a norm. Although the
original (and still common) test for this effect involved a
chairman helping or harming the environment, hardly any
of these findings have been applied to business ethics.
We review what little exploration of the implications
for business ethics has been done. Then, we present new
experimental results that expand the attribution asymmetry
to virtue and vice. We also examine whether it matters to
people that an effect was produced as a primary or side-
effect, as well as how consumer habits might be affected by
this phenomenon. These results lead to the conclusion that
it appears to be in a businessperson’s self-interest to be
virtuous.
Keywords Attributions  Knobe effect  Side-effect 
Side-effect effect  Vice  Virtue
Introduction
In the popular media, business leaders are more often
portrayed as vicious masterminds rather than as benevolent
giants. The financial crisis of 2007–2008 generated a spate
of hardnosed investigative reportage on the excess and
greed of the boom years (Sorkin’s Too Big to Fail, Lewis’s
The Big Short and Liar’s Poker, and McLean and Nocera’s
All the Devils are Here, to name a few examples). Cor-
porations were the supervillains in the four of the last five
James Bond movies, while the greatly hyped film adapta-
tion of Ayn Rand’s Atlas Shrugged was a box office flop.
The Occupy Wall Street movement dominated the news
cycle for much of the second half of 2011, branding the
mantra ‘‘We are the 99 %’’ deep in the zeitgeist.
It would seem, then, that businesses and businesspeople
have an uphill climb ahead of them if they want to be
regarded as virtuous, or at least as not vicious. One might
be tempted to respond by bemoaning this sorry state of
affairs or sermonizing about the proper scope of business
activity. We suggest an alternative path. Based on recent
findings in the growing field of experimental philosophy,
which attempts to probe, systematize, and explain ordinary
people’s intuitions about philosophical problems and con-
cepts, we make some suggestions about what it might take
to be considered virtuous in a business context.
We center our discussion on the side-effect effect (also
known as the Knobe effect, after its discoverer), which crops
up when people make attributions of psychological states to
agents. In a nutshell, the effect is this: people are more willing
to attribute a variety of attitudes (intention, belief, knowledge,
desire, advocacy, etc.) to someone who brings about a norm-
violating side-effect than to someone who brings about a
norm-conforming side-effect. For instance, people are more
inclined to say that the chairman of a company intentionally
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harms the environment in his single-minded pursuit of profit
than that he intentionally helps it, even if the help is a side-
effect of profit seeking as well.
Because the side-effect effect came as such a surprise to
philosophers of mind, most of the relevant subsequent
research has been an attempt to explain it, rather than to draw
out its normative implications. Two exceptions to this gen-
eralization are Nadelhoffer (2004), who worries that the side-
effect effect spells trouble for juror impartiality, and Wible
(2009), who explores some potential consequences for
business ethics. Thus, although the experiment in which this
effect was first detected involved a business decision, sur-
prisingly little work has been done to develop the implica-
tions of the side-effect effect for business ethics, and none of it
has connected the effect with the concepts of virtue and vice.
In this article, we attempt to fill that gap. We begin by
briefly reviewing the evidence for the side-effect effect, as
well as Alfano et al.’s (2012) interpretation of that evidence,
which we take to be the most plausible explanation of the
side-effect effect in the literature. Next, we critique Wible’s
exploration of the side-effect effect in the business ethics
context, arguing that his distinctive contribution is based on a
misunderstanding of its nature. After clearing the ground in
this way, we discuss three new experimental findings. First,
all extant studies of the side-effect effect have dealt with
attributions of propositional attitudes, such as intention,
belief, knowledge, desire, and advocacy; we expand the
scope of the effect to include the character traits of compas-
sion and callousness. Second, we report the surprising result
that people are more inclined to attribute intentionality to a
norm-violating side-effect than to a norm-violating primary
effect.1 That is to say, people seem to be more willing to say
that someone intentionally brings about a norm-incongruent
side-effect than that he intentionally brings about the same
effect when he explicitly announces that that is what he means
to do. This surprising result suggests that business leaders
should be especially wary of producing negative externalities
as side-effects. Third, we report results suggesting that con-
sumers and other counterparties are willing to punish vicious
businesspeople by not doing business with them and to pay a
premium to deal with virtuous businesspeople.2 Finally, we
conclude by exploring various applications of these results to
the context of business ethics. We argue against the view that
in the business context, morality requires only a bare mini-
mum of not violating any norms. Instead, businesspeople are
generally expected to be virtuous. Merely producing norm-
conforming side-effects is insufficient to be regarded as vir-
tuous. Instead, the norm-conforming effects must be primary
and intended. One of the most effective means of appearing
virtuous, we contend, is actually being virtuous. Further,
since our results indicate that consumers will reward those
who appear virtuous and punish those who appear vicious,
virtue appears to be in a businessperson’s self-interest.
Finally, we note that people’s notion of virtue that emerges
from our data is consonant with a Neo-Aristotelian concep-
tion of virtue.
The Side-Effect Effect
Although Knobe (2003) did not set out to examine issues in
business ethics, he used an executive decision scenario in
his seminal study of the side-effect effect. In this experi-
ment, participants read one of the following two vignettes
(emphasis ours):
Harm: The vice-president of a company went to the
chairman of the board and said, ‘‘We are thinking of
starting a new program. It will help us increase
profits, but it will also harm the environment.’’ The
chairman of the board answered, ‘‘I don’t care at all
about harming the environment. I just want to make
as much profit as I can. Let’s start the new program.’’
They started the new program. Sure enough, the
environment was harmed.
Help: The vice-president of a company went to the
chairman of the board and said, ‘‘We are thinking of
starting a new program. It will help us increase
profits, and it will also help the environment.’’ The
chairman of the board answered, ‘‘I don’t care at all
about helping the environment. I just want to make as
much profit as I can. Let’s start the new program.’’
They started the new program. Sure enough, the
environment was helped.
Participants were asked to what extent they agreed with the
claim that the chairman intentionally harmed or helped the
environment. As you can see, the two vignettes are
identical in all respects except the valence of the predicted
side-effect. Despite this structural similarity, participants
were more inclined to say that the chairman intentionally
harmed the environment than that he intentionally helped
it. This is an example of the side-effect effect.
Since 2003, there has been a lively debate among phi-
losophers and psychologists about the best explanation of
1 Although the convention in philosophy of mind would designate the
opposite of a side-effect a ‘‘main effect,’’ we use the expression
‘‘primary effect’’ in order to avoid confusion with the statistical
expression ‘‘main effect,’’ which will be used to describe the results
below.
2 Note that we are discussing here ordinary people’s attributions of
mental attitudes, virtues, and vices. There is of course a question
whether the people’s patterns of attributions are right or even roughly
correct. Nevertheless, from the point of view of business leaders,
people’s attributions matter even when they are mistaken. As we
show in the ‘‘New Experimental Results on Virtue and Vice’’ section,
people are less inclined to do business with a company whose leaders
they regard as vicious.
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the effect. Knobe (2003) initially proposed that it indicated
that the concept of intentional action was essentially mor-
alized, and that normativity was somehow built into the
very concept of intentionality. However, in the ensuing
years, it has become clear that the scope of the side-effect
effect is much broader than initially assumed, both in terms
of the types of states it applies to and in terms of the types of
norm-violations that trigger it. It is not just about attribu-
tions of intentionality. The effect crops up for attributions of
cognitive attitudes such as belief (Beebe and Jensen 2012,
Beebe, in preparation), knowledge (Beebe and Buckwalter
2010), and remembering (Alfano et al. 2012). It also shows
up for attributions of motivational attitudes such as decid-
ing, being in favor of, and advocacy (Pettit and Knobe
2009). Moreover, it is not just about attributions following
moral norm violations. The effect can be triggered by
having the protagonist violate a prudential norm (Knobe
and Mendlow 2004), an esthetic norm (Knobe 2004), a legal
norm (Knobe 2007), a conventional norm, or even purely a
descriptive norm (Alfano et al. 2012).
The most reasonable interpretation left standing after
considering the diverse circumstances in which the side-
effect effect arises is the heuristics approach of Alfano et al.
(2012). According to this view, people tend to employ a pair
of interlocking heuristics. First, they are disposed to notice
and form beliefs about others’ norm violations. When
somebody does something contrary to a norm, people take
note. This is why attributions of all kinds of mental states
increase when the target of the attribution violates a norm.
We can reconstruct the attributor’s reasoning as follows:
‘‘He did x which goes against norm y, which he should have
foreseen. So he must have formed the intention to violate
the norm (formed the desire to violate the norm/believed
that he would violate the norm/known that he would violate
the norm).’’ Second, when deliberating about what to do,
people are sensitive to potential norm violations, and are
therefore more disposed to form intentions, desires, beliefs,
and so on, in exactly the situations where others are more
inclined to attribute those states to them.
As Alfano et al. emphasize, this explanation of the
side-effect effect not only saves the phenomena, but also
makes the pattern of people’s attributions of attitudes
understandable, even rational. It makes sense to pause and
deliberate when the action you are about to take would
violate a salient norm. Deliberation in turn leads to the
formation of various mental attitudes, such as beliefs,
desires, and intentions. Since we have limited cognitive
resources, it is sensible to curtail our deliberative engage-
ment to those cases where ignorance (particularly of whe-
ther a norm is being violated) would be most deleterious.
Such cases typically involve the violation of norms, and so
it would be reasonable to deliberate more about potential
norm-violation than about potential norm-conformity.
If this is right, then one prima facie plausible upshot of
the side-effect effect turns out to be mistaken. It might seem
immediately obvious in light of this effect that profit-driven
businesses and businesspeople risk being blamed for bad
effects they produce (whether as primary effects or as side-
effects), but are not in a position to receive credit for good
effects they produce (again, whether as primary or side-
effects). From this, it would seem to follow that businesses
should concentrate only on avoiding negative effects and
not on producing positive externalities. For instance: do not
pollute, but also do not bother about improving environ-
mental conditions. This seems to be the conclusion that
Wible (2009) draws. The heuristics story suggests other-
wise. In fact, we will argue that if the heuristics interpre-
tation of the side-effect effect is correct, businesses have
good reason to avoid negative externalities (both as primary
and as side-effects) and to produce positive ones (especially
as primary effects). In the next section, we critique Wible’s
application of the side-effect effect to business ethics, then,
in the subsequent sections, present our own application.
Wible’s Interpretation
Little work has been done to explore the ramifications of the
side-effect effect for business ethics. As we mentioned above,
so far only Wible (2009) has done so. While we appreciate his
expansion of the side-effect effect into the realm of business
ethics, we believe that some of his conclusions deserve new
examination. Since the publication of Wible’s article, addi-
tional research has both expanded the scope of the effect and
forced a reinterpretation of its nature, and the application of
the effect to business ethics must be updated in light of these
subsequent developments. In particular, we want to explain
why some of Wible’s conclusions will no longer work, and
then use his conclusions as a stalking horse; once we see what
the implications of the side-effect effect are not, we can start
to reconsider what they really are.
Originally, intentionality was the only psychological
state thought to be subjected to the side-effect effect. So, not
surprisingly, Wible’s analysis and application of the side-
effect effect is based on this view. In particular, he assumes
that knowledge and belief are not subjected to the effect
(2009, p. 175). In reality, however, the phenomenon has a
much wider scope than originally thought. As we pointed
out above, people are more inclined to attribute knowledge
and belief (as well as many other mental attitudes) to pro-
tagonists in norm-incongruent conditions than in norm-
congruent conditions. Furthermore, Wible seems to sub-
scribe to a mixture of Knobe’s conceptual competence
model and Nadelhoffer’s (2004) distortion model of the
side-effect effect, claiming that moral considerations as
well as praise and blame mediate the effect (2009, p. 176).
Virtue and Vice in the Business Context
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As Alfano et al. (2012) have shown, though neither of those
theories is consistent with the full range of data on the side-
effect effect, some studies have found the side-effect effect
in cases without a moral norm at play, such as Knobe (2004)
with an aesthetic norm and Alfano et al. (2012) with con-
ventional and descriptive norms. If praise and blame med-
iated the effect, it would not appear in such non-moral cases.
Wible’s first conclusion is that praise and blame do not
attach directly to the valence of the side-effect (2009,
p. 176). He contends that people do not blame the pro-
tagonist for producing a bad effect (or praise him for
producing a good effect) as such. Instead, they praise or
blame the actor’s motives, using both what he says and the
effects he produces as evidence of those motives. So the
chairman is morally blameworthy not for what he does as
such, but for why he does what he does, namely only caring
about profits. The moral failing of the chairman is that he
lacks the proper motive of also caring for the environment.
Wible surmises that this moral failing of the chairman is
responsible for the side-effect effect. If, in the harm con-
dition, the chairman had not been so immoral in his sin-
gular fixation on profit, then he would not have ended up
harming the environment. Thus, people have good reason
to blame him for producing this deleterious side-effect.
People also regard the side-effect as intentional because it
is a direct result of his explicitly immoral, profit-seeking
behavior, according to Wible. Conversely, in the help
condition, people find nothing meritorious or intentional in
the chairman’s helping the environment because of his
prior moral failing of only caring for profits. The chairman
should care about profits and the environment.
This is a tempting conclusion to draw, especially for the
purpose of business ethics, as it lets us condemn single-
minded pursuit of profit. While initially plausible, new evi-
dence appears to challenge the claim. This explanation
appears to work for the original 2003 vignettes, but falls apart
when applied to subsequent side-effect effect studies. As we
explained in the previous section, the effect also crops up in
attributions of motivational attitudes such as desire, decision,
and advocacy. People are more inclined to say that someone
wanted to produce a norm-incongruent side-effect than a
norm-congruent one. Furthermore, as Alfano et al. (2012)
have shown, the side-effect effect appears when the norm
violated is purely descriptive, with no moral content what-
soever.3 In such a case, praise and blame cannot be invoked
as mediating factors. For instance, they tested a case of a non-
moral, descriptive norm with the following vignette:
Jessica lives in a neighborhood where everyone
(including Jessica herself) happens to own a dog. One
afternoon, she is planning to go for a walk and
decides not to/to take her dog. Her friend Aaron says,
‘‘Jessica, if you go out like that, you will/won’t be
doing what everyone else is doing.’’ Jessica responds,
‘‘I don’t care at all what everyone else is doing. I just
want to go for a walk without/with my dog.’’ She goes
ahead with her plan, and sure enough, she ends up
doing what everyone/no one else is doing.
The side-effect effect was detected in participants’ attri-
butions of intentionality to Jessica. They were more
inclined to say that she intentionally did what no one else
was doing (walking without a dog) than that she intention-
ally did what everyone else was doing (walking with a
dog). For the models that Wible employs to explain this
effect, people would have to blame Jessica for her lacking
the allegedly proper motive of caring about what everyone
else happens to be doing. The doxastic heuristics model of
Alfano et al. however, easily accounts for this finding.
Jessica violated a norm—a merely descriptive norm, yes—
but a norm nonetheless. That is the sort of thing people
instinctively take note of, and about which they are
therefore more inclined to attribute propositional attitudes.
Morality, praise, and blame do not enter into it. This is not
to say that the side-effect effect supplies no lessons on the
role of profit seeking by businesses, a point on which we
will present our own conclusions later.
Following on the previous conclusion, Wible presents a
second understandable but mistaken conclusion based on
Knobe’s (2003) study, namely that a profit-focused busi-
nessperson can be credited with intentionally producing a
good side-effect if she or he is a moral agent with other
motives in addition to profit-seeking. Wible describes a
variant on the original vignette in which the chairman
responds to the news that the new program will increase
profits and help the environment by saying, ‘‘Great! I care
about helping the environment. I am happy that we can
help the environment and make a profit at the same time.
Let us start the program.’’ In this version of the vignette,
the chairman does not rank the profit motive above the
environmental impact. In fact, it might even seem that he is
more concerned with helping the environment, since that is
what he mentions first. The conclusion based on this
vignette therefore contains a subtle elision of the difference
between primary effects and side-effects. If an agent has
only one goal (making a profit) and in achieving that goal
(implementing the new program) produces a side-effect,
whether or not the side-effect is generally considered
intentional depends on whether or not a norm was violated
3 Knobe (2004) also found the side-effect effect in cases involving an
esthetic norm. It is preferable to adopt an explanation of the side-
effect effect that covers all cases of the phenomena rather than to have
several theories; each account for only some of the data. Wible’s
explanation then seems inadequate on this criterion, while Alfano and
company’s heuristics account succeeds. So far, Alfano et al. (2012) is
the only attempt we know of that attempts to be consistent with all the
published side-effect effect studies.
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when the agent acted. If, however, an agent has two
goals—such as making a profit and helping the environ-
ment—then by definition, there is no side-effect; there are
two primary effects, both of which are intentional. When a
businessperson who strives to increase profits and help the
environment enacts a program that achieves both goals,
neither effect is a side-effect. In the next section, we dis-
cuss new experimental data that suggest exactly this: it is
possible to produce a good effect while making a profit and
to be praised for that good effect, but only when it is a
second primary effect, not a side-effect.
Wible bases his final conclusion on the obligations of
businesspeople on Thomson’s (1971) notion of a ‘‘Mini-
mally Good Samaritan.’’ Thomson contrasts the Maximally
Good Samaritan—who will aim for good results (like help-
ing the environment) to the point of sacrificing his own life—
with the minimally good Samaritan—who will do some
good, but not when the costs are high. Wible applies this
distinction to business ethics, arguing that businesspeople
have a moral obligation only to live up to the standard of the
minimally good Samaritan, not the maximal one. In terms of
Knobe’s chairman, a businessperson is obligated to produce
the good side-effect of helping the environment, but only if
profits also increase. We can call this view this Minimally
Good Businessperson Theory.
We not only take Wible to be on the right path with this
conclusion, but also contend that his view can be improved
upon. First, as we noted regarding the previous conclusion,
Wible thinks a minimally good Samaritan can intentionally
produce good side-effects, and it is his obligation to do so when
possible. But, a closer examination of the case in which this
happens reveals that what is produced is a second main effect,
not a side-effect. Hence, this conclusion needs to be recast in
terms of two primary effects, instead of one primary effect and
one side-effect. Second, virtue theory is in a better position to
express the moral obligations of the businessperson than
competing theories. Wible will have to claim that there is a
myriad of good and proper motives that a businessperson ought
to have in addition to seeking profits; helping the environment
is but one. Alternatively, we could require that businesspeople
have the motives of increasing profits and being virtuous, or—
if you prefer a slightly more nuanced view—of having (and so
demonstrating when appropriate) enough of the virtues. Third,
while Wible only speaks of what businesspeople’s motives
ought to be, we can offer a reason why; being virtuous appears
also to be in their self-interest. To develop these points, we
must now turn to our new experimental findings.
New Experimental Results on Virtue and Vice
We turn now from our critique of Wible to the articulation
of the real upshot of the side-effect effect for business
ethics. To this end, we think that the ethical implications of
the side-effect effect will be clearer by expanding our focus
beyond the mere intentionality of the side-effect to also
include attributions of character traits, especially virtues
and vices. Before turning to new empirical evidence on this
score, let us begin with a thumbnail sketch of the nature of
virtue and vice. Next, we argue that the side-effect effect
extends beyond the attribution of propositional attitudes
(belief, knowledge, intention, desire, etc.) to character
traits. If this is right, and if businesses and business leaders
want to be thought of as virtuous rather than vicious, then
certain normative and prescriptive conclusions follow.
The notion of a virtue is not univocal, but one attractive
conception is the Neo-Aristotelian theory according to
which a virtue is a complex disposition comprising a
cluster of sub-dispositions, including a perceptual sensi-
tivity, a tendency to construe ambiguous situations in
particular ways, a motivation, deliberative excellence, and
the ability to carry out intentions reliably and successfully
(Alfano 2013; Zagzebski 1996, p. 137). For example,
generosity is not just the disposition to give resources to
people, or even to give resources to people who need them.
Such a disposition seems insufficiently reason-guided to
count as a virtue. Rather, the generous person is disposed to
notice opportunities for giving, to construe ambiguous cues
charitably, to want to help, to deliberate soundly about
what would help in each particular circumstance, and to act
reliably and successfully when she intends to help. Note
that many of these sub-dispositions refer to attitudes that
are subject to the side-effect effect. Noticing and construal
lead to belief, knowledge, and remembering; wanting is a
form of desire; and acting involves intentions. It seems
plausible, then, that people will be more inclined to attri-
bute a virtue to someone if he or she violates a relevant
norm while acting in accordance with a virtue than if he or
she acts in accordance with a virtue without violating a
norm. Of course, the norm violated cannot be a moral norm
(since then he or she would not be acting virtuously), but as
we explained above, the side-effect effect is triggered by
all sorts of violations, including violations of self-regarding
norms and even descriptive norms.
A vice is not merely the absence of some virtue; it is the
presence of a morally bad disposition that is structurally
similar to a virtue. Thus, a vice is also a complex dispo-
sition comprising a cluster of sub-dispositions, including a
perceptual sensitivity, a tendency to construe ambiguous
situations in particular ways, a motivation, deliberative
excellence, and the ability to carry out intentions reliably
and successfully. While the compassionate person notices
suffering, construes ambiguous cues correctly, wants to
alleviate suffering, deliberates well about how to do so in
the particular circumstances, and reliably acts on the
intention to do so, someone with a correlative vice inverts
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at least one of the sub-dispositions. For instance, a sadistic
person notices suffering and construes ambiguous cues
correctly, but what he wants is not to alleviate suffering but
to cause or at least observe it. A callous person tends to
notice suffering and construe ambiguous cues correctly; he
just does not care about others’ well being. This tendency
is in contrast with the merely careless person who may
want to help alleviate suffering but is too morally obtuse to
notice it, as well as the weak-willed person who notices,
construes, desires, and deliberates well but who—when it
finally comes to acting—fails to carry out his good inten-
tions. Since the component parts of a vice are structurally
similar to those of a virtue, it might seem by parity of
reasoning that people will be more inclined to attribute a
vice to someone if she violates a relevant norm while
acting in accordance with a vice than if she acts in
accordance with a vice without violating a norm. The
parity breaks down, however, because there is no way to
act in accordance with a vice without violating a norm,
namely the norm not to be vicious. Thus, all vicious
behavior is likely to trigger the side-effect effect, making
vice attributions more prevalent than virtue attributions.
This is a worrisome implication for business leaders.
In order to more systematically investigate the nature
of the relationship between norm violations and the
attribution of vice and virtue, the above points were
tested experimentally. Participants (N = 81, Mage = 34.4,
40 women) were recruited and compensated using Ama-
zon.com’s Mechanical Turk. The sample was restricted to
adults living in the United States.
Participants were presented with one of four vignettes
describing the CEO of a corporation who is approached by
his vice-president. In all the four vignettes, the vice-pres-
ident presents the CEO with a new policy that will produce
an increase in profits. Two of them involve increasing the
workforce by 10 %, while the other two involve the firing
of 10 % of the current employees. The vignettes also varied
with respect to the CEO’s reaction to the vice-president’s
proposal. Sometimes the CEO only cares for increasing
profits, making the change in the number of employees
(either up or down) a side-effect. At times, the CEO has
two goals, increasing profits and hiring or firing employees
(depending on the experimental condition). In these cases,
the hiring or firing is no longer a side-effect, but a primary
effect. Consequently, the outcome (hire or fire) is brought
about in one of two ways: as a primary effect or as a side-
effect. The result is a 2 (outcome) 9 2 (effect-type) fac-
torial design. Each participant viewed only one of the four
vignettes, and therefore, was only included in one of the
four experimental conditions.4
After reading the vignette, participants were asked to
rate their level of agreement with four statements: (1) The
CEO intentionally harmed/helped the workers. (2) The
CEO was callous. (3) The CEO was compassionate. (4) I
would avoid purchasing products produced by the com-
pany, even if I had to pay more. These questions were
presented in random order, and were meant to assess par-
ticipants’ attributions of intentionality, vice, virtue, and the
degree to which the CEO’s conduct would influence their
own future purchasing behaviors. Ratings of agreement
were on a Likert scale ranging from 1 (Strongly Disagree)
to 7 (Strongly Agree).
Let us begin with participants’ ratings of intentionality
across the four vignettes (see Fig. 1). With respect to the
intentionality ratings, the results of a two-way analysis of
variance (ANOVA) indicated significant main effects of
both the outcome, and the effect-type conditions. These
main effects indicate that both the outcome and the effect-
type variables influence participants’ ratings of the CEO’s
intentionality. Specifically, when the outcome is fire, the
CEO is more likely to be perceived as having acted
intentionally than when the outcome is hire: F(1,
77) = 59.27, p \ .001, gp
2 = .44. Likewise, when the
effect-type is a primary effect, the CEO is also more likely
to be perceived as having acted intentionally than when the
effect-type is a side-effect: F(1, 77) = 9.04, p \ .01,
gp
2 = .11. However, we should be cautious in drawing
conclusions from these main effects, since a significant
interaction of outcome and effect-type on intentionality
ratings was also observed: F(1, 77) = 33.42, p \ .001,
gp
2 = .30. This interaction indicates that the effect-type
(i.e., primary effect vs. side-effect) influences participants’
intentionality ratings differently depending on the outcome
condition (i.e., hire vs. fire). We see this interaction in
Fig. 1. When fire is the outcome, we see that participants
in the side-effect condition gave a slightly higher mean
intentionality rating than participants in the primary-effect
condition. But when hire is the outcome condition,
participants in the side-effect condition gave much
lower ratings of intentionality than participants in the
primary-effect condition. Essentially, the effect-type vari-
able influences intentionality ratings differently depending
on whether the outcome is hiring or firing.
Follow-up simple effects tests revealed that within the hire
condition, participants in the primary-effect condition pro-
vided significantly higher intentionality ratings compared to
those in the side-effect condition: F(1, 77) = 38.24, p \ .001,
gp
2 = .33. This result indicates that people are not inclined to
say that a business leader intentionally brings about a bene-
ficial side-effect, but that they are inclined to say that he
intentionally brings about a beneficial, second primary effect.
It is worth mentioning two additional points regarding
Fig. 1. First, note that intentionality ratings are stable4 See Appendix for the full text of each of the vignettes.
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across the hire and fire conditions when the outcome is a
primary effect. Essentially, when the CEO asserts that
hiring or firing is one of his principal concerns, the out-
come does not impact his perceived intentionality. In
contrast, the intentionality ratings differ greatly between
the hire and fire conditions when the outcome is a side-
effect. This difference proved significant in follow-up tests:
F(1, 77) = 87.68, p \ .001, gp
2 = .53.
Second, and somewhat surprisingly, within the fire
outcome condition participants were more likely to attri-
bute intentionality when the CEO fired workers as a side-
effect than when firing workers was the primary effect.
This difference proved statistically significant in follow-up
tests: F(1, 77) = 3.89, p = .05, gp
2 = .05. Thus, when the
CEO fired his employees, participants were more likely to
say that he did so intentionally when it was a side-effect
than when it was a primary effect. This is a surprising
result, and one that—to our knowledge—has not yet been
reported in the literature. We think it might be possible to
interpret it with the Alfano et al. heuristics theory, but
doing so goes beyond the scope of this article; at the very
least, this is a finding that merits further investigation.5
Next, we asked participants to rate the callousness of the
CEO (see Fig. 2). A two-way ANOVA again revealed a
main effect of both the outcome condition and the effect-
type condition. Just as above, these main effects indicate
that both the outcome and the effect-type variables influ-
ence participants’ ratings of the CEO’s callousness. Not
surprisingly, when the outcome is fire, the CEO is more
likely to be perceived as being callous than in the hire
outcome condition: F(1, 77) = 29.92, p \ .001, gp
2 = .28.
Likewise, when the effect-type is a side-effect, the CEO is
also more likely to be perceived as being callous than when
the effect is a primary one: F(1, 77) = 14.85, p \ .001,
gp
2 = .16. We should again be cautious in drawing con-
clusions from these main effects: however, since we find a
statistical interaction of outcome and effect-type on ratings
of callousness: F(1, 77) = 15.55, p \ .001, gp
2 = .17. This
interaction indicates that the effect-type influences ratings
of callousness differently depending on the outcome con-
dition. As we see in Fig. 2, within the fire condition, par-
ticipants in the side-effect condition and the primary-effect
condition gave callousness ratings that were quite similar
(and high). Yet within the hire condition, callousness
ratings seem to differ quite substantially depending on the
effect-type condition. Follow-up tests confirmed a statisti-
cally significant difference indicating that participants were
more likely to view the CEO as callous if the hiring of
more workers was a side-effect rather than a primary
effect, F(1, 77) = 30.11, p \ .001, gp
2 = .28.
Notice in Fig. 2 that in three of the four experimental
conditions the CEO is viewed as quite callous. It is only
when the CEO’s primary goal was hiring that he was
viewed as less callous. Furthermore, within the fire con-
dition, ratings of callousness do not differ significantly
depending on whether the firing was brought about as a
primary effect or a side-effect, F(1, 77) = 0.00, ns. A CEO
who fires his employees as a side-effect is just as likely to
be perceived as callous as one who does so as a primary
effect.
If we turn our attention to ratings of compassion, we find
essentially the reverse of the pattern reported above (see
Fig. 3). Using a two-way ANOVA we observed significant
main effects of both the outcome and the effect-type con-
ditions. Once again, this indicates that the effect-type and
outcome variables are significant predictors of participants’
ratings of the CEO’s level of compassion. Not surprisingly,
with respect to the outcome condition, when the CEO hires
employees: he is more likely to be viewed as compassionate
than when he fires employees, F(1, 77) = 31.22, p \ .001,
gp
2 = .29. Regarding the effect-type condition, the CEO is
more likely to be viewed as compassionate when the out-
come is a primary effect than when the outcome is a side-
effect: F(1, 77) = 14.35, p \ .001, gp
2 = .16. But again, we
should be careful in our interpretation of these main effects
since we also find a significant statistical interaction
of outcome and effect-type on ratings of compassion:
F(1, 77) = 18.13, p \ .001, gp
2 = .19. This interaction
indicates that effect-type influences compassion ratings
differently depending on the outcome condition. This
finding is apparent in Fig. 3, where we see that, within the
fire condition, ratings of the CEO’s level of compassion
from the primary-effect and the side-effect conditions are
fairly similar. However, within the hire condition, we can
see that participants who read about the CEO who hired
Fig. 1 Summary of mean intentionality ratings by condition. Error
bars indicate ±1 standard error of the mean
5 The closest thing to a study contrasting attributions in side-effect
and primary-effect cases is Cova et al. (2012). They contrasted side-
effect cases with means-to-an-end cases, and found that the side-
effect cropped up for both, but that means were overall judged to be
more intentional than side-effects. We are encouraged by this finding,
since it seems plausible to think of means as falling between primary
effects and side-effects on the scale of intentionality.
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employees as a primary effect were more likely to rate him
as compassionate compared to those participants who read
about the CEO who hired employees as a side-effect. Fol-
low-up tests confirmed that this was a significant difference.
Within the hire condition, participants gave significantly
higher compassion ratings when hiring was a primary effect
compared to when it was a side-effect: F(1, 77) = 32.06,
p \ .001, gp
2 = .29. This result is to be expected. When the
CEO asserts that hiring employees is one of his principal
concerns, he is more likely to be viewed as compassionate.
Within the fire condition, however, follow-up tests find no
significant difference between compassion ratings when the
CEO fired employees as a primary effect versus when he
fired employees as a side-effect, F(1, 77) = 0.11, ns. If the
CEO fires his employees, then he is unlikely to be perceived
as compassionate regardless of whether the firing was his
primary objective or a side-effect.
Finally, we examined participants’ self-reported incli-
nations to avoid purchasing from the CEO’s company (see
Fig. 4). A two-way ANOVA revealed main effects for both
the outcome condition and the effect-type condition. This
indicates once again that the effect-type and the outcome
conditions influence participants’ inclinations to avoid
purchasing from the CEO’s company in the future. More
specifically, when the outcome is the firing of employees,
participants are more likely to report that they would
avoid purchasing from this company rather than when the
outcome is the hiring of employees: F(1, 77) = 23.39,
p \ .001, gp
2 = .23. And similarly, when the CEO brings
about the outcome as a side-effect, participants are also
more likely to avoid purchasing from his company rather
than when the outcome is a primary effect: F(1, 77) = 6.45,
p \ .05, gp
2 = .08. However, in our analysis of correlations,
we found that the inclination to avoid purchasing from the
company was highly correlated with participants’ ratings of
the CEO’s callousness, r = .50, p \ .001. Therefore, in
order to control for the influence of perceived callousness
on the inclination to avoid purchasing, we included
callousness as a covariate in a two-way analysis of
covariance (ANCOVA). Callousness proved to be a sig-
nificant predictor in the model: F(1, 77) = 9.00, p \ .01,
gp
2 = .11, and the analysis revealed a significant main effect
of outcome: F(1, 77) = 7.43, p \ .01, gp
2 = .09. But
interestingly, when the data were analyzed in this more
nuanced way, there was no longer a significant main effect
for the effect-type condition on the inclination to avoid
purchasing: F(1, 77) = 1.53, ns. Thus, after we controlled
for the influence of callousness ratings, the only significant
predictor of participants’ inclination to avoid purchasing
was whether or not the CEO fired employees. The differ-
ence between this ANCOVA model and the original
ANOVA model seems to indicate that the influence of the
effect-type condition on the inclination to avoid purchasing
is at least partly explained by participants’ ratings of the
CEO’s callousness. This mediational hypothesis was tested
empirically using a bootstrapping procedure (Bollen and
Stine 1990) with 5,000 draws in the bmem package of R
(Zhang and Wang 2009). Results confirmed that the influ-
ence of the effect-type condition on the inclination to
avoid purchasing is mediated by participants’ ratings of the
CEO’s callousness. We observed a significant indirect
effect with callousness ratings mediating the relationship
between the effect-type variable and the inclination to avoid
purchasing: B = –.52, 95 % CI [–1.11, –0.13].6,7 This
suggests perceived callousness is one reason the effect-type
influences the inclination to avoid purchasing, which in turn
indicates that business leaders have especially strong rea-
sons not to appear callous or otherwise vicious. Their rep-
utations will suffer and people will be less inclined to do
business with them in the future, a point we develop further
in the next section.
One final note before we turn from these data to a sus-
tained discussion of their upshot for business ethics. As we
pointed out in the introduction section in this article, the
original experiment documenting the side-effect effect
involved a business context in which the business leader
makes decisions that impact the environment. Environ-
mental help and harm are only some of the externalities
that business leaders need to take into account if they care
about how their actions are interpreted and their moral
character assessed. In this section, we described studies
related to one of those other externalities: contributing
to (un)employment. There are certainly others. On the
Fig. 2 Summary of mean ratings of the CEO’s callousness by
condition. Error bars indicate ±1 standard error of the mean
6 We are grateful to Joshua Knobe for suggesting we test this
hypothesis.
7 This mediational model was also tested using not only the more
common—but also more conservative—Sobel test (MacKinnon et al.
1995). The results mirrored those of the bootstrapping test of
mediation; there was a significant indirect effect with callousness
mediating the relationship between the effect-type variable and the
self-reported inclination to avoid purchasing, Z = -2.47, p \ .05.
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positive side, businesses can provide useful services and
products, pay taxes, and afford opportunities for the culti-
vation of skills. On the negative side, they can provide
hazardous services and products, shirk their tax responsi-
bilities, endanger workers, and alienate workers from the
means of production. We have not yet investigated whether
the side-effect effect will crop up in relation to all of these
potential externalities, but given the effect’s robustness so
far, we have good reason to suspect that it will. As such
there is good reason for businesspeople to apply the nor-
mative lessons from our study generally to a wide range of
externalities, and not just to matters of contributing to
(un)employment. So let us turn to those lessons now.
Application to Business Ethics
In interpreting our experimental results and applying them
to business ethics, we will begin by extrapolating specific
lessons from our data, points immediately entailed by our
findings. From there, we will expand to some larger con-
clusions that the data suggest. The first and most basic
lesson here is that businesspeople must be aware of and
conform to norms relevant to their behavior in the work-
place. If the side-effect of a businessperson’s action—be
she a CEO or a mailroom worker—violates a norm that is
(or should be) salient to her, then she will be regarded as
having intentionally violated the norm and blamed for it.
Even worse, she will be seen as vicious! That means that if
your side-effect violates a norm, others will see you as
having a general disposition to behave that way. They’ll
generally expect you to violate at least that norm again in
the future, and perhaps other norms as well. Your very
reputation as a businessperson is at stake.
However, we should not draw the further conclusion that
one can only be blamed (and thought vicious) for violating
a norm, but never praised (and thought virtuous) for
adhering to it. Such a conclusion would advocate a
bare-minimum theory of business ethics, where business-
people should only concern themselves with a basic
decency of not violating norms, while they need not worry
about being especially virtuous either. Wible considered
and rejected this view as inadequate. On this point we
concur and roundly reject such a theory of business ethics.
In place of the bare-minimum theory, Wible offered his
minimally good businessperson theory. While we regard
Wible to have been on the right track, our results indicate
that his theory does not go far enough. We can now explain
why more is required of businesspeople. In their stead, we
propose our Compassion-Expectation Theory, which—
briefly put—claims that businesspeople are expected to and
ought to be compassionate (at least when doing so is
consistent with profitability),8 and people will tend to
reward them for being compassionate and punish them for
being callous.
The simple explanation for the insufficiency of both the
bare minimum and minimally good theories is that they
violate people’s expectations. Our findings indicate that
people generally expect more of a CEO than merely not to
violate norms. All three theories predict that the CEO in
both fire conditions to be callous. What the compassion-
expectation theory predicts and finds as well, though, is that
the CEO who increased hiring a side-effect would also be
regarded as callous. The bare minimum view neither pre-
dicts nor explains this result, since the CEO did not violate a
norm. As it turns out, people typically expect more of
businesspeople than mere norm conformity. Increased
hiring as a side-effect should also be sufficient to meet the
requirements of Wible’s minimally good businessperson
Fig. 4 Summary of means for the inclination to avoid purchasing
from the CEO’s company by condition. Error bars indicate ±1
standard error of the mean
Fig. 3 Summary of mean ratings of the CEO’s compassion by
condition. Error bars indicate ±1 standard error of the mean
8 We cannot provide any conclusions on the basis of our data here
as to what degree virtuous behavior is expected or required of
businesspeople at the cost of profitability. Despite being a legitimate
and important question, it goes beyond the scope of our study which
focused solely on cases in which profitability was not a variable.
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view. People, however, apparently expect businesspeople to
help intentionally.
One might object at this point that intuitions about
intentionality, compassion, and callousness are not appro-
priate sources for positing or rejecting a normative theory
of business ethics. Not only are the intuitions we probed
highly fallible, but they are also the intuitions of ordinary
people and hence theoretically uninformed or un-illumi-
nating. This concern would have merit were it not for two
points. First, the view expressed by our participants does
not stand alone; it conforms to the Neo-Aristotelian notion
of virtue (and vice). In particular, our results are evidence
for the theoretical link between intentionality and virtue.
Second, satisfying people’s moral expectations is in the
CEO’s self-interest since doing so appears likely to
increase profits. As our mediational results indicate, par-
ticipants’ assessments of virtue or vice mediated the impact
of effect-type on the desire to do business with a company.
On the first point, the intuitions of ordinary people
expressed in our findings conform to the Neo-Aristotelian
view: virtue is not accidental. According to this view, one
must be aiming at and striving for virtuous ends to achieve
them. Accidentally realizing a good effect (i.e., an effect
that not only does not violate norms, but also achieves
some social good) does not make one virtuous. Rather, the
Neo-Aristotelian view holds that in order for an effect to be
a product of virtue, it must be intentionally produced. That
is because virtue itself cannot be accidentally achieved; it
must the intended and strived for result. For instance, to act
courageously, not only one must overcome a threat, but one
must also perceive it as a threat. Someone cannot perform
an action and discover afterward that it was courageous
because (unbeknown to her at the time) her life was in
danger when performing the action. Likewise, performing
an action that just so happens to end up helping someone in
need is insufficient to establish the virtues of compassion or
charity. The agent must recognize the action at the time as
helpful to those in need.
This theoretical view closely matches our data. Our
results (along with a host of others on the side-effect effect)
indicate that participants are significantly less willing to
attribute intentionality to a side-effect that merely does not
violate a norm. Participants were much less willing to
attribute the virtue of compassion to the CEO who hired
but only as a side-effect. Rather they only considered the
CEO compassionate when he hired more employees as an
additional primary effect. These results are not odd; they
are consonant with the Neo-Aristotelian picture of virtue.
If the moral intuitions people reported were unsystematic
and couldn’t be given a theoretical underpinning, then it
would be justifiable to ignore when formulating a norma-
tive theory of business ethics. Fortunately, that is not the
case here. Our results are evidence for the requirement that
virtues (in this case compassion) require intentionality,
as claimed for a long time by the Aristotelian tradition of
virtue ethics. That point alone provides sufficient reason to
consider people’s intuitions in normative theory construc-
tion. Luckily, in the case of our compassion-expectation
theory, we also have a second reason.
The second reason we have for looking to people’s
intuitions as having implications for a normative theory of
business ethics goes back to our finding that people’s
perceptions of callousness help us explain why the effect-
type impacted their stated inclination to avoid purchasing
from the CEO’s company. This mediation indicates how
people are responding to a problematic case. It is reason-
able to consider why the type of effect (primary or sec-
ondary) impacts people’s inclination to do business with a
company, as we observed. As it turns out, in this case, their
perceptions of compassion and callousness explain this
relationship.9 The more callous they found the CEO, the
less inclined they were to do business with him in the
future. Three of our four CEOs were regarded as more
callous, and participants were generally more willing to
punish him by avoiding future purchases. On the other
hand, they were less willing to punish the CEO whom they
regarded as more compassionate.10 Appearing compas-
sionate (and not callous) seems to be profitable.
One might worry at this point that all we have found are
self-reports of whether or not participants will avoid pur-
chasing from a businessperson, and they may be very
biased. People might want to report the intention to
financially punish vicious businesspeople and reward vir-
tuous ones because it would make them feel better about
themselves as good and virtuous people. But these biased
self-reports may diverge from how they actually behave in
the marketplace. Consumers may say they will only buy
from virtuous businesspeople, but that might not match
how they actually spend their money.
Though this concern has some merit, there is empirical
evidence that suggests consumers are not completely
deceiving themselves. People at least sometimes actually
do reward companies they find to be honest and hard
working and punish those they see as vicious. To offer a
couple of recent examples, consumers punished BP after
the recent environmental disaster in the Gulf of Mexico
(Swint 2010). On the other hand, when Ford did not take
bailout money during the Great Recession (while GM and
Chrysler did) consumers rewarded Ford by buying more of
their cars than those manufactured by other American
9 See Sripada (2011) for a similar point about mediation.
10 Presumably, participants who report themselves to be less willing
to punish the compassionate CEO will be more likely to praise him
and reward him with future business. Despite being intuitive, this
move is theoretical since our study only asked about participants’
willingness to punish.
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carmakers (Williams 2010). While consumers may not
always punish the vicious and reward the virtuous, there is
plenty of evidence indicating that they often behave this
way.
Admittedly, perceptions of compassion and callousness
are not the only factors influencing one’s purchases. People
do not just buy what the virtuous have to sell; they buy
what they want and need. But the point remains that these
perceptions do in part mediate how we intend or want to
behave toward the compassionate or callous. For instance,
how many of us wanted to punish BP in 2010 after their
environment disaster in the Gulf of Mexico? But how many
also still ended up, at least once, stopping at BP gas station
to fill up, perhaps because it was the cheapest nearby
alternative? In that case, our perception of callousness
caused us to want to punish BP, but other factors some-
times superseded that desire. Companies compete with one
another on many dimensions. A company can acquire a
competitive advantage by producing more efficiently,
selling at a lower price point, having higher quality prod-
ucts, or guaranteeing products with warrantees and implicit
branding. If our results are correct, than a company can
also acquire a competitive advantage by appearing more
virtuous than its peers. Presumably, in many cases, the cost
associated with appearing virtuous is less than the cost of,
for instance, reducing prices. Executives should therefore
think of their reputation for virtue as one of several ways to
differentiate their business. The lesson is that business-
people have a self-interested reason to go beyond the bare
minimum morality or Wible’s minimally good theory
and appear compassionate. Doing so will tend to increase
profits.
Note that so far we have only spoken of appearing
compassionate. Just because the CEO is thought to be
compassionate by our participants based on this one action
does not mean that he actually is. All we know is that he
appears compassionate, which tells us that businesspeople
ought to appear compassionate. Our theory goes further,
claiming that businesspeople ought to be compassionate
because, we want to suggest, being compassionate is one of the
most efficient and reliable ways to appear compassionate.11
At this point, we move more into the realm of suggested
conclusions that are at least consistent with our data. So
long as there in fact is any correlation between people’s
reports of a willingness to punish callous businesspeople,
our results suggest a Profit-Compassion Hypothesis:
ceteris paribus, being a compassionate business person will
tend to increase profits and being callous will tend to
decrease profits. However, our results only found a corre-
lation between attributions of a virtue and likelihood of
avoiding purchases with the CEO’s company. So we need a
link between attributions of virtue and actually being vir-
tuous to render the profit-virtue hypothesis plausible. To
that end, we propose the Appearance of Compassion
Strategy: ceteris paribus, one of the most efficient and
reliable means for having a virtue widely attributed to you
is to behave regularly in a manner consistent with that
virtue. How is that accomplished? Well, one could put up a
systematic pretense of virtue, perhaps abetted by a public
relations campaign. Or one could just be virtuous. Pre-
sumably, both would lead to reliable behavior in accor-
dance with virtue. The question is therefore which is more
efficient: Does it make more sense just to be virtuous, and
so be perceived so, or to pretend to be virtuous, all the
while attempting to convince others that you are virtuous?
We do not have empirical evidence that relates directly to
this claim, but we think that it is plausible to suggest that
for most people most of the time, it is easier just to be
virtuous than to pretend to be so. Much of the time, faking
virtue is a lot harder and less reliable than actually being
virtuous.
Note that the appearance of compassion strategy does
not claim that being compassionate is the only way to
appear compassionate. It surely is the case that a CEO
could hire a savvy public relations firm to separate
appearances from reality in the minds of ordinary people.
Our claim is instead that being compassionate is a reliable
and efficient means for appearing compassionate. The CEO
with the PR firm will need to employ their services regu-
larly to keep up the fallacious appearance of compassion.
Not only will that get expensive, there is no guarantee it
will work; appearances might well catch up with him at
some point.
Finally, it is worth noting that so far, we have only
tested for the virtue of compassion and the vice of cal-
lousness, and found compassion to appear to be in one’s
self-interest. While our data cannot speak to other virtues
and vices, some theoretical extensions of our results are
possible. We take it that there is not nothing particularly
special about compassion and callousness (in general or in
a business context) such that our findings—that the side-
effect effect and the mediation between trait attributions
and reporting of a willingness to punish—will not show up
for other virtues and vices. This expectation does not
11 One might worry that the is-ought problem arises at this point,
thinking that we have moved from factual statements about how
participants responded to the normative conclusion about how
businesspeople ought to behave. Luckily, this concern is easily
allayed. One commits the is-ought fallacy by inferring a normative
conclusion (an ‘‘ought’’ as it were) from a set of only factual premises
(‘‘is’’ statements). As long as there is at least one normative premise
as well, one has not committed the is-ought fallacy. Such is the case
here. Our premises include not only the fact that people report
themselves willing to punish the callous, but also the normative
assertion that business people ought be profitable. Thus, our
normative conclusion is legitimate.
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commit us to Aristotle’s unity of virtue thesis (that to have
a virtue, one must possess them all). Our point here is the
much weaker claim that most virtues exhibit a similar
structure. Compassion involves a sensitivity to need, a
disposition to construe, a motivation, deliberative excel-
lence, and reliability in acting on the deliverances of
deliberation. The sub-dispositions of compassion produce
mental states the attribution of which is subject to the side-
effect. Most other virtues involve similar sub-dispositions
and hence produce mental states of the same type. It is
therefore plausible to hypothesize that their attribution will
be subject to the Knobe effect as well.
We therefore recommend further testing for other
virtues, such as wisdom and prudence. We predict, first,
that people will not attribute other virtues to businesspeo-
ple when they merely produce norm-conforming side-
effects, but rather only when the norm-conforming effects
are primary, and so intended. Second, we predict that there
will be a similar mediation between participants’ percep-
tion of the virtue and vice in question and their self-
reported intentions to avoid doing business with those they
regard as possessing the corresponding vice. However, it is
not unreasonable to expect a difference in the strength of
the mediation. Some virtues and vices may play a greater
or smaller role in determining participants’ inclination to
avoid doing business with an agent. For instance, people
presumably would want to punish callous businesses more
than profligate businesses, but less than sadistic businesses.
To sum up, in this article, we have argued that the most
attractive interpretation of the side-effect effect, along with
the new experimental evidence we report, suggests that
businesspeople are both expected to behave and pruden-
tially ought to behave in accordance with compassion
specifically (and likely virtue in general). Since it is plau-
sible that the best way to achieve this end is actually to
have or cultivate compassion, it follows that the best
business strategy is to cultivate compassion (and likely
many other virtues as well).
Appendix
Fire/Side-Effect
The vice-president of a manufacturing company was talk-
ing with the CEO. The vice-president said, ‘‘We are
thinking of implementing a new policy. If we implement
the policy, it will increase profits for our corporation. It will
also mean that we have to fire 10 % of our employees,
many of whom will have difficulty finding other work.’’
The CEO said, ‘‘I don’t care at all about the employees.
I just want to make as much money as possible. Let’s
implement the policy.’’
They implemented the policy. Just as the vice-president
had predicted, profits increased, 10 % of the employees
were fired, and many of them were unable to find other
work.
Hire/Side-Effect
The vice-president of a manufacturing company was
talking with the CEO. The vice-president said, ‘‘We are
thinking of implementing a new policy. If we implement
the policy, it will increase profits for our corporation. It will
also mean that we have to increase our workforce by 10 %,
hiring many people who would have difficulty finding other
work.’’ The CEO said, ‘‘I don’t care at all about the
employees. I just want to make as much money as possible.
Let’s implement the policy.’’
They implemented the policy. Just as the vice-president
had predicted, profits increased, the workforce was
increased by 10 %, and many of the new workers would
have been unable to find other work.
Fire/Main Effect
The vice-president of a manufacturing company was talk-
ing with the CEO. The vice-president said, ‘‘We are
thinking of implementing a new policy. If we implement
the policy, it will increase profits for our corporation. It will
also mean that we have to fire 10 % of our employees,
many of whom will have difficulty finding other work.’’
The CEO said, ‘‘I’ve been looking for ways to fire some of
our employees, and of course I always want to increase
profits. Let’s implement the policy.’’
They implemented the policy. Just as the vice-president
had predicted, profits increased, 10 % of the employees
were fired, and many of them were unable to find other
work.
Hire/Main Effect
The vice-president of a manufacturing company was
talking with the CEO. The vice-president said, ‘‘We are
thinking of implementing a new policy. If we implement
the policy, it will increase profits for our corporation. It will
also mean that we have to increase our workforce by 10 %,
hiring many people who would find it difficult to find other
work.’’ The CEO said, ‘‘I’ve been looking for ways to hire
some more employees, and of course I always want to
increase profits. Let’s implement the policy.’’
They implemented the policy. Just as the vice-president
had predicted, profits increased, the workforce was increased
by 10 %, and many of the new workers would have been
unable to find other work.
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